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OPERATION OF THE MODIFIED SPECIAL VERDICT
IN CIVIL ACTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
By FRANcIS E. WINSLOW*
The Constitution of the United States' and the Constitution of North Carolina2 both guarantee trial by jury, the
latter according to the "ancient mode". It is a "trial by a
jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the
law, and to advise them on the facts".' The Constitution
of North Carolina 4 has guaranteed "the ancient mode of
trial by jury" since 1776. 5 In 1796 there arose a great
feud between influential lawyers and the Bench over the
attitude of the judges in cases involving confiscation of
the lands of Tories, and the lawyers being in the legislature, the judges out, the former procured the passage of
an act 6 providing that "no judge in giving a charge to the
petit jury, either in a civil or criminal action, shall give an
opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, that
being the true office and province of the jury; but he shall
state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in
the case and deliver and explain the law arising thereon".
The first clause of this statute is of doubtful constitutionality, since in a jury trial according to "the ancient mode"
the judge was not forbidden to express an advisory opinion
on the facts in the case. 7 The second clause of the statute
is declaratory of the common law with respect to the duty
* A.B., 1909, University of North Carolina; attended School of Law,
University of North Carolina, 1909-10; Columbia Law School, 1910-11.
President, North Carolina Bar Association, 1937-38; State Delegate for
North Carolina, American Bar Association, 1941-43; Member, North Carolina State Committee of Special Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice, American Bar Association.
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899).
North Carolina Const. (1868) Art. 1, Sec. 19. Smith v. Kappas, 219
N. C. 850, 854, 12 S. E. (2d) 693 (1941).
See 8upra, notes 1 and 2.
'North Carolina Const. (1868) Art. 1, Sec. 19.
'North Carolina Const. (1776) Declaration of Rights, Sec. 14.
'Now N. C. Con. Stat. (1919) See. 564.
ISee supra, notes 1 and 2; Thomas, Use and Abuse of the "JurySystem,
24 N. C. Bar Assoc. Reports 58. But in 145 years the question has not
been presented to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See also:
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898).
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of the judge. Although at common law the judge's charge
was given to instruct the jury in returning a general verdict, statutes curtailing the common law privilege of the
jury, to render either a general or a special verdict, and
empowering the court to require a special verdict, are
constitutional and do not impair the right of trial by jury.8
Under the North Carolina Constitution of 1868, abolishing
the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity
and providing for one form of action, denominated a civil
action, and that "the facts at issue (shall be) tried by order
of court, before a jury",9 and that the General Assembly
shall "regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of
proceeding, in the exercise of their powers, of all the
courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may
be done without conflict with other provisions of this constitution","0 the General Assembly of 1868, adopted the
"Code of Civil Procedure"," which retained the statute of
1796 relating to the judge's charge, 2 but simplified the
judge's task by empowering him to require of the jury
a modified form of special verdict in lieu of the common
law general verdict. 18 This is termed a "general verdict"
in North Carolina, 4 as distinguished from the common
law special verdict, which is still permitted," though rarely
used in civil cases, but it is not the common law general
verdict. 6
INSTRUCTIONS ON LAW
One of the arguments used by some law writers in
favor of special verdicts is that their use obviates the
necessity of the jury's considering the law at all. It is
sometimes said that if the issues are properly framed, there
is no need of instructions on the law.' 7 North Carolina
I Udell v. Citizens St. Ry., 152 Ind. 507, 515, 52 N. E. 799 (1899).
'North Carolina Const. (1868) Art. 4, Sec. 1.
10 North Carolina
Const. (1868) Art. 4, Sec. 12.
11 This is substantially the Field Code.
"See 8upra, n. 6.
N. C. Con. Stat. (1919) Secs. 584, 585, 587.
14 Porter v. Western N. C. R. Co., 97 N. C. 66, 2 S. E. 580 (1887).
15 N. C. Con. Stat. (1919) Secs. 585, 587.
"6Green, A New Development in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A. B. A. Journal
715, 719.

" Ibid.
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adopted a modified form of special verdict, not for the
purpose of getting away from instructions to the jury by
the court, but for the purpose of making the duty of the
jury an easier one to perform, and the charge of the
court a simpler one for the jury to understand. In North
Carolina a proper charge from the court is deemed absolutely essential to make the trial a jury trial, as guaranteed
by the constitution, as distinguished from a submission of
the case to a board of twelve arbitrators. In the most
recent expression of the North Carolina Supreme Court on
this subject, Associate Justice Barnhill writes:18
"The duty of guidance perforce devolves upon the
judge,-a duty incident to the high office which he
holds and made imperative with us by statute, . . .
The feature of the statute here invoked is declaratory
of this constitutional right. To emasculate the one is
to impinge upon the other . . . To declare and explain
the law arising upon the evidence in a case means to
declare and explain it as it relates to the various aspects of the testimony offered. While no general
formula is or should be prescribed, something substantially more than a general definition or an abstract
discussion is required. The judge should at least
give a resume of the facts upon which plaintiff relies,
and as to which she has offered evidence, and instruct
them as to the law arising thereon. He should do likewise as to evidence offered by the defendant. That is,
it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury as to the
circumstances under which the issue should be answered in the affirmative and under which it should
be answered in the negative. When the law is thus
explained and applied, it can be followed with intelligent understanding. On the other hand a general
definition or an abstract discussion of the law, and
nothing more, leaves the jurors to grope in the dark
for a fair and righteous answer to the issue. It is for
this reason that the court has been somewhat meticulous in insisting upon a substantial compliance with
its requirements. Without it there can be no assurance that the verdict represents a finding by the jury
under the law and on the evidence presented."
"8See supra, n. 2.
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As will be hereinafter seen, most issues comprising a
modified special verdict, as used in North Carolina, present
mixed questions of law and fact. Typical issues are those
of negligence, or contributory negligence. The special
verdict is favored over a general verdict by professor Edson R. Sunderland, not because it gets away from the necessity of instructions altogether, but because it requires
a concrete form of instruction which is of some real aid to
the jury. He says: 19
"It must be admitted that as long as the line of
demarcation between law and fact is incapable of
being drawn sharply, in accordance with well defined
qualitative differences, there will always be a class of
matters called mixed questions of law and fact with
which juries will have to deal. These will necessitate
instructions to the jury in matters of law....
But
the inherent intricacy of general instructions on the
whole case is so great compared with the relatively
simple instructions commonly requisite to put the jury
in a position to render an intelligent special verdict,
that the change from general to special verdict would
carry us a very long way toward the goal we are seeking ....
It is therefore no reflection on the soundness of a principle of procedure that it operates only
within limits. This rather demonstrates its merit as
something free from the visionary claims of a Utopian
panacea."
As issues are framed in North Carolina, the actual finding
of the jury, the real meaning of the verdict, is often found
only by a reference to the charge of the court.20
21
The form of instructions required in North Carolina
was the subject of favorable comment by Judge Morris A.
Soper, of the Fourth United States Circuit Court of Appeals, at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference in Asheville, North Carolina, on June 21, 1940,22 and is advocated
by the Special Committee on Improving the Administra19

266.

Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 253,

2 State v. Murphy, 157 N. C. 614, 72 S. Rl. 1075 (1911) ; Groves v. Baker,
174 N. C. 745, 94 S. E. 528 (1917).
21
Except the prohibition against intimating any opinion on facts.
29 (1941) 24 Jour. Amer. Judicature Society 111.
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tion of Justice, of the American Bar Association, in a monograph prepared for that committee in 1941, by Judge W.
Calvin Chesnut, of the United States District Court for
Maryland. 3 Like Judge Soper, Judge Chesnut also takes
exception to that part of the North Carolina statute which
probably has been unconstitutional since its enactment.
The practice in North Carolina as to instructions to the
jury is substantially the same as that which may be expected in Maryland under Rule 6 (a) and (b) for the trial
of actions at law, of the General Rules of Practice and
Procedure, effective September 1, 1941. The Maryland
rule (Rule 6 (c) and (d)) seems to be superior to the
North Carolina practice with respect to objections to the
charge and exceptions on appeal. Under the Maryland
rule and in the United States District Court, objections
to any portion of the instructions must be made before the
jury retires (but out of the hearing of the jury), to preserve an exception for an appeal. In North Carolina any
error in the charge on the law is deemed excepted to without the filing of any formal objections at the time.24 This
requires the judge to be more alert than counsel and
makes the case "open season" for him with respect to the
charge required by statute. The number of appeals on
the ground of error in the charge would be more numerous
even than they are, but for the rule that counsel must
object in open court to the misstatement of factual contentions of the parties or a failure to state such a contention. 5
A statement of the factual contentions of the parties is not
required by the statute, but is habitually made;2 6 and a
11 Copies of this monograph may be secured from the office of the Executive Secretary of the American Bar Association, 1140 N. Dearborn St.,
Chicago, Illinois.
" N. C. Con. Stat. (1919) Sec. 590 (2).
25 Hood v. Cobb, 207 N. C. 128, 176 S. E. 288 (1934).
11 Rocky Mount Say. and Trust Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 282,
167 S. E. 854 (1933). A skillful and astute judge can go far toward shortcircuiting the prohibition against intimating any opinion on the facts by
the manner in which he gives the non-statutory part of the charge, the
statement of the "contentions of the parties." The attitude of the Supreme
Court toward such use of the charge is set forth in the case here cited:
"The statement of the contentions has steadily grown into an accepted and
helpful body of practice in trial courts. While counsel have sometimes
insisted, In rare instances, that such statements were partial and bore the
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failure to object promptly on this phase of the charge
waives the objection. It is believed that appeals based on
errors in the charge would be very rare indeed if the rule
adopted in Maryland and in the United States District
Court on this subject were in force in North Carolina. The
number of such appeals has been the subject of recent
criticism in North Carolina.
The statutory provisions in North Carolina above referred to, regulating the form of verdicts, have substantially the same effect as Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, and
Rule 7 of the new Maryland rules, except that in North
Carolina there is no reservation to the court of the right
to make any finding upon any controverted issue which
is omitted. If a material issue is not submitted, the party
aggrieved cannot complain, unless he requested that the
issue be submitted,2 but the answered issues remaining
must be sufficient to support the judgment, as nothing will
be presumed in its support. 29 The Federal and the Maryland rules permitting the judge to supply omitted findings
are a distinct improvement over the North Carolina practice, and if effective in North Carolina would further reduce the small number of appeals based on the omission
of issues.
SPECIAL QUESTION

PRACTICE

The easing of the burden upon both court and jury,
through the use of the modified special verdict, may be
made to appear by describing what happens in the trial of
a civil action in North Carolina. The reader may contrast
the proceedings with a law case in a jurisdiction where
general instructions are required of the judge, and a general verdict is required of the jury. Although there is but
one form of civil action in North Carolina for the trial of
tang of the 'stump'; nevertheless, the practice springs from a worthy and
intelligent effort to designate and clarify to the jury the determinative
issues of fact. They tend to clear the battlefield of smoke and noise ...
No error." (204 N. C. 282, 285, 167 S.E. 854, 855).
,7Dissenting opinions in Ryals v. Carolina Contracting Co., 219 N. C.
749, 485, 14 S. E. (2d) 531, 535 (1941).
21Maxwell v. McIver, 113 N. C. 288, 18 S.E. 320 (1893).
'1 Tucker v. Satterthwafte, 120 N. C. 118, 27 S. E. 45 (1897).
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issues of fact at law and vital questions of fact in equity,
and although all disputed ultimate facts both at law and
in equity must be determined by the jury, nevertheless
the fundamental distinction between legal and equitable
pleas and principles is preserved in North Carolina."
Since this paper is concerned as nearly as possible only
with actions at law, such actions will be dealt with (but
equitable defenses are permitted in actions at law). In
actions at law the issues are usually few in number and
framed to determine the ultimate facts upon which liability
depends, and in some classes of cases have become standardized. In equity cases or cases involving equitable defenses, the issues are more numerous and have a tendency
to become evidentiary in form.
When a case is called for trial and both sides announce
themselves ready, the judge directs the plaintiff to proceed
with the selection of the jury. When the plaintiff is satisfied, he directs the defendant to satisfy himself with the
jury. The examination on the voir dire is conducted by
counsel after preliminary statements, first by plaintiff's
counsel, and then by defendant's counsel, of the nature
of the claim and the nature of the defense, before the
pleadings are read. When the twelve are empaneled, the
court directs counsel for the plaintiff to read the complaint, and counsel for defendant to read the answer, to
court and jury. The reading of the pleadings further enlightens the jury and serves in lieu of any opening statements by counsel as to what they intend to prove. When
the pleadings have been read the issues appear. Frequently the judge immediately calls for issues from both
sides. An issue of fact arises upon any material allegation in the complaint or new matter in the answer, or new
matter in the reply, which is controverted."
"Issues shall
be framed in concise and direct terms, and prolixity and
confusion must be avoided by not having too many issues." 2 In the run-of-the-mine case, such as a negligence
" MCINTOSH, NORTH

CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES,

60.

IN. C.Con. Stat. (1919)
82 N. C. Con. Stat. (1919)

Sec. 582.
Sec. 584.
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case, or a suit upon a promissory note, what the issues will
be is so well understood by counsel that the court does not
call for issues upon the reading of the pleadings, but immediately calls for the evidence. If issues are tendered
before the evidence is received they usually have to be
revised in some respect after the evidence is all in. An
issue, e. g., contributory negligence, may arise upon the
pleadings, but if there is not sufficient evidence to warrant
a verdict in favor of the pleader on such an issue, it will
not be submitted. As soon as the evidence is completed,
the character of the essential questions in dispute appears
more clearly than upon the reading of the pleadings alone.
Although the exact wording of the issues may not have
been agreed upon, the lines of battle are now so clearly
drawn that motions attacking the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict either on the whole case or
on any material issue may now be finally determined.
Likewise, motions for a directed verdict may now be determined. If issues have been tendered, without evidence
in support thereof, they are now eliminated. If the case
is to go to the jury, the judge in a simple case dictates to
the court reporter the final form of the issues. Sometimes
he directs one of the counsel to dictate the issues, in the
presence of his opponent. Counsel usually agree on the
issues between themselves. In the event of disagreement
they gather around the judge's bench, or retire to his
chambers, and thresh out the points of difference there.
If the conference does not produce agreement, the judge
fixes the form of the issues. Any party aggrieved notes
exceptions to any or all of the issues finally submitted, and
to the refusal of any or all of the issues tendered by him.
Appeals follow as of course when issues are submitted
without evidence in support, or are refused when there is
evidence in support, or are ineffective to decide the legally
material matters in dispute, but the majority of such appeals would be taken any way on other grounds, e. g., refusal of motion to nonsuit or for directed verdict. Appeals
based solely on the issues submitted are extremely rare.
Appeals based on mere technical contentions as to the
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wording of the issue are so uniformly unsuccessful that
they have practically disappeared. If lawyers understand
the essential points of difference in the case, there is little
difficulty in formulating questions to the jury to be answered categorically, yes, or no, which will settle the facts
of the case.
NEGLIGENCE CASES

In a case which was tried in June, 1941, the plaintiff
administrator, c. t. a., sought recovery for the wrongful
death of his testator, in an automobile accident which occurred while he was driving defendant's car. The grounds
of liability alleged were that the defendant had supplied
the car to the plaintiff's testator, when the rear tires were
dangerously slick, and the defendant had failed to warn
the driver of this condition, although he had no reason to
believe that the driver was aware of it. The defense was
a general denial, a specific allegation that the plaintiff's
testator was aware of the condition, and a plea of contributory negligence based on the plaintiff's testator's knowledge, as well as on the allegation that the driver negligently used the brakes while the car was skidding on a
wet pavement. Motion for nonsuit was overruled and the
case went to the jury on the following issues, agreed upon
by counsel:
1. Was the death of plaintiff's testator caused by
the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint?
Answer:

Yes.

2. Did the plaintiff's testator contribute to the injury which caused his death by his own negligence, as
alleged in the answer?
Answer:

Yes.

3. What damages is plaintiff entitled to recover
of the defendant?
A nswer:

$....................
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Upon the coming in of the verdict the defendant tendered judgment in accordance therewith. The plaintiff
moved that the verdict on the second issue be set aside
and for a new trial on that issue; and in the alternative
that the entire verdict be set aside, and a new trial
awarded. The court declined the defendant's motion and
allowed the plaintiff's motion, setting aside the entire verdict and ordering a new trial. The defendant appealed,
and the appeal is now pending. 8 One of the appellant's
contentions will be that the court acted outside the bounds
of his judicial discretion in setting aside the verdict on the
second issue, because upon all the evidence construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there being no evidence except that introduced by the plaintiff, the court
should have allowed the motion for nonsuit on the ground
of contributory negligence, and should have directed a
verdict for the defendant on that issue; that where the
verdict went in the same direction the law would have
sent it, the trial court could not set it aside. The defendant
appellant will contend that this is so because the evidence
showed without contradiction and beyond dispute that
the plaintiff's testator did have full knowledge concerning
the condition of the rear tires on the car. But the plaintiff
appellee will almost certainly contend that the jury may
have found the issue of contributory negligence against
the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's testator
negligently put on brakes while the car was skidding,
rather than on the ground of his knowledge, and that the
evidence of plaintiff's testator's negligence in this respect,
in the emergency in which he found himself, does not
clearly appear from the evidence, that stronger inferences
might be drawn that in putting on the brakes he acted as a
prudent man would have done, and that the judge in this
situation had the discretion which he could and did exercise in ordering a new trial. The issue as framed does not
" Nash, Admr., v. Philips, to be argued at the 1941 Fall Term, Supreme
Court of North Carolina. It is a risky business for one of counsel for
defendant appellant to be writing about a pending case, but it so perfectly
illustrates the inter-relation of the charge and the verdict that the risk is
assumed.
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disclose exactly what the jury decided, but in connection
with the charge of the court, the exact meaning of the verdict becomes plain.
The charge of the court in that case is typical. After
the issues were settled, and counsel had completed their
arguments to the jury, the judge had the last word with
his charge, which he delivered orally, with the use of notes.
He first explained briefly the nature of the claim, and the
nature of the defense. He then explained to the jury
how the three issues submitted would determine the entire
lawsuit. He then took up each issue seriatim. On the
first issue, as to negligence, he summarized the evidence,
explained where the burden of proof lay, read from his
notebook definitions of negligence and proximate cause,
(which the jury probably did not understand), and then
stated the contentions made by the plaintiff and by the
defendant with respect to the application of the law to the
evidence. The judge listened to the arguments of counsel
and made notes, either mentally or otherwise, and was
able succinctly to outline the contentions of the parties.
(Any error or omission in this part of the charge would
be waived by failure to object at the time). Finally he
charged the jury directly, specifically, and concretely, how
they should answer this issue, as follows:
I charge you this is the law: If you find from the
evidence and by its greater weight that on the occasion
in question, that is the night that Mr. Nash was killed,
the automobile in which plaintiff's testator was riding
belonged to the defendant, which fact is admitted, and
that the two rear tires with which said car was
equipped were old and worn and slick, and that the
treads of both the said tires were entirely worn away,
and that this condition was such as to constitute a
defect or a dangerous condition of a nature and degree
that a person in the exercise of due and ordinary care
and prudence would realize and know that the use of
such automobile in that condition would present an
unusual and extraordinary peril and hazard, and if
you further find from the evidence and by its greater
weight that the defendant knew such condition at the
time he permitted plaintiff's testator to ride in and
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drive said automobile, as alleged in the complaint, and
that knowing such condition, the defendant failed to
communicate such knowledge and information to the
plaintiff's testator, and that he failed to warn him of
the unusual and extraordinary peril and hazard, and
if you further find from the evidence and by its
greater weight that the condition of the rear tires, as
before set out, was a proximate cause of the injuries
and death of plaintiff's testator, you will answer the
first issue "Yes."
He then took up the second issue, as to contributory
negligence, and treated it similarly, as separate and distinct
from the first issue. He concluded the charge on the second
issue by the following definite instruction:
I charge you this, if you find from the evidence
and by its greater weight that plaintiff's testator knew
or in the exercise of due and ordinary care and prudence should have known the condition of the defendant's tires, then and in that even you will answer the
second issue "Yes".
The two quoted paragraphs constitute the heart of the
charge. They apply the law to the facts of the case, but
leave the jury to determine the facts. From the charge
it appears that the jury found plaintiff's testator was guilty
of contributory negligence, not on the ground that he
improvidently used the brakes, but solely on the ground
that he had full knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition of the tires. In this case the modified special verdict
performed every function which could have been performed by a common law special verdict. But the jury,
although fully capable of rendering a modified special verdict, with the assistance of the judge, tendered through
instructions, would in all probability have been unable to
intelligently and comprehensively write out for their
special verdict, in the common law form, all the essential
facts. Juries do not have secretaries. If a common law
general verdict had been rendered in this case--"We the
jurors, find for the defendant"-there would have been
no possible way to ascertain the ground upon which they
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decided the case. Furthermore, the defendant would have
been deprived of any opportunity to present for review the
action of the judge in setting the verdict aside. A description of this case illustrates not only the formulation of
the issues, but the function of the judge's charge.
In another negligence case,8 4 one for personal injuries,
the defense was a general denial, contributory negligence,
and joint enterprise. The issues were substantially the
same, although in not exactly the same words, as in Nash
v. Philips, described above, with an additional issue:
"Were the plaintiff and defendant engaged in a
joint enterprise, so as to bar the plaintiff's action, as
alleged in the answer?"
In negligence cases the issues are pretty well standardized into three: negligence, contributory negligence, and
damages, with the addition of other issues covering various
defenses, such as the fellow servant rule, release, assumption of risk, contribution between joint tort feasors, indemnity against the primary tort feasor, etc. The issue
as to the insulation of the negligence of one person by the
intervening negligence of another is usually covered by
the primary issue as to negligence. This involves the
definition of proximate cause. The judge instructs the
jury that if they find the defendant was guilty of negligence, but that the negligence of another intervened and
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, they
should answer the first issue "No". It is permissible and
would seem to be the better practice to submit a separate
issue as to insulation. Otherwise, it can never be known
whether the jury decided that neither of the parties accused was guilty of negligence causing the injury, or, if
just one of them, which one. Consequently neither the
trial judge, nor the appellate court, could review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the exact finding of the
jury.
1,Jernigan

v. Jernlgan, 207 N. C. 831, 178 S. E. 587 (1935).
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In an insurance case 35 begun in the State Court of North
Carolina but removed to United States District Court, tried
under the new Federal Rules, substantially the same as
the North Carolina rules, the plaintiff sought to recover
upon a policy of accident insurance for the death of her
husband. The defendant answered that the insured did
not die of accidental means, within the meaning of the
policy, that he died as the result of suicide, (specifically
excluded from coverage), that the plaintiff failed to give
notice or furnish proof of loss or give the defendant the
right and opportunity to have an autopsy, and that plaintiff
failed to bring her suit within two years, as required by
the policy. The plaintiff made oral reply, written reply
being waived, that the defendant had waived compliance
with policy conditions as to notice, proof of loss and
autopsy; that although the present action was not brought
within two years from the death of the insured, another
action was so brought and was nonsuited, and the present
action was instituted within one year after said nonsuit. 6
Upon the reading of the pleadings, the District Judge
called for issues from both sides, which were tendered.
The plaintiff tendered the following issues:
(1) Was plaintiff at time of death of Dr. Gorham
totally incapacitated mentally to give the notice and
offer to make proof of loss as required by said policy?
Answer:
(2) Did plaintiff, through her attorney, give said
notice and offer to make said proof of loss as soon
thereafter as was reasonably possible?
Answer:
(3) Was defendant informed of the death of Dr.
Gorham within 90 days of its occurrence and of the
circumstances surrounding it upon which it relies for
defense?
Answer:
8 Gorham v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association of Omaha,
114 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), cert. denied 85 L. Ed. 494 (U. S. 1941).
11N. C. Con. Stat. (1919) Sec. 415.
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(4) Did defendant fail to make timely demand for
opportunity to perform an autopsy upon the body of
Dr. Gorham?
Answer:
(5) Was defendant fully informed of the result
of plaintiff's autopsy before trial of this action?
Answer:
(6) Did defendant, upon receipt of notice of claim
by plaintiff, deny or disclaim liability under said
policy?
Answer:
(7) Was the death of Dr. Louis R. Gorham the
result of bodily injuries sustained through purely accidental means other than suicide, sane or insane?
Answer:
The defendant tendered the following issues:
(1) Did the plaintiff give to the defendant immediate notice of alleged accidental death of Louis R.
Gorham as required by standard provision No. 4 in
the policy referred to in the pleadings?
Answer:
(2) If not, did she give such notice as soon as reasonably possible?
Answer:
(3) Did the plaintiff furnish affirmative proof of
loss to the defendant company at its office as required
by said policy?
Answer:
(4) Did plaintiff give defendant the right and opportunity to have an autopsy or its equivalent as required by Standard Provision No. 8 in said policy?
Answer:
(5) Was the death of Louis R. Gorham on or about
March 8, 1933, the result of suicide committed by him,
whether sane or insane?
Answer:

SPECIAL VERDICTS
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(6) Was this action brought within two years from
the expiration of the time within which proof of loss
was required by the policy, as required by Standard
provision No. 14 in said policy?
Answer:
(7) If not, was another action brought within said
two years and nonsuited, and this action brought on
the same policy
within six months after the entry of
87
said nonsuit?
Answer:
(8) Did Louis R. Gorham die as a result, directly
and independently of all other causes, from bodily
injuries sustained while said policy was in force,
through purely accidental means?
Answer:
The judge took the issues tendered under consideration, and heard the evidence. At the conclusion thereof the
defendant moved for a directed verdict, on the ground that
upon all the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was not sufficient evidence to
go to the jury on waiver of compliance with the policy
conditions, that therefore the issues tendered by the plaintiff should be rejected, and that upon all the evidence
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all
the issues tendered by the defendant should be answered
in its favor. The motion was granted, judgment signed,
and affirmed on appeal. 8
This case illustrates how a complicated case can be
reduced to a small number of simple, easily understood
questions. If the case had gone to the jury, the District
Judge could have-made plain to the jurors their duty with
respect to each question put to them. If they had been
permitted to render a general verdict either for the plaintiff or for the defendant, it would have been impossible
to ascertain the real meaning of their verdict, what facts
they found, what they understood the law to be, or how
1Defendant
contended that N. C. Con. Stat. (1919)
rather than Sec. 415.
11 See supraz, n. 35.

Sec. 6290 applied,

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VI

they applied the law to the facts; the jurors might have
found that the insured died by accidental means, but that
the plaintiff had breached policy conditions, either as to
notice, proof of loss, or autopsy; but no one would ever
have known. The sufficiency of the verdict could only
have been tested as a whole, and not with reference to
the specific finding which determined the case.
EJECTMENT

In a common law ejectment action, 39 plaintiffs sought
to recover a valuable tract of land as executory devisees
under the will of one Wells Draughn, dated Feb. 17, 1870,
probated Sept. 24, 1872. The first taker, Thomas Sears,
who owned as devisee in fee, defeasible upon his death
without leaving issue him surviving, had died, without
leaving issue, in April, 1926, thus making effective the
devise over to the plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that
the defendants were in wrongful possession of the land,
claiming title under deed to Richard H. Jones, from the
executor of Wells Draughn, who had no title or authority
to convey, and that said deed was void. The action was
begun in 1927. The answer did not controvert these facts,
but the defense was that in his lifetime Wells Draughn
had entered into a contract in writing, binding upon his
heirs, to convey the land in question to Richard H. Jones;
that said Richard H. Jones contemporaneously executed
and delivered purchase money notes; that Richard H.
Jones, under whom defendants claimed, went into possession of the land as purchaser in 1872; that the contract to
convey was lost, and had been for fifty years; that Richard
H. Jones paid the purchase money notes either to the
executor of Wells Draughn, or to the legal holder of said
notes; that defendants, and those under whom they
claimed, particularly Richard H. Jones, had been in quiet
and undisturbed possession of the land since 1872, under
said contract; that the plaintiffs held under the will only
a naked legal title, as trustees for the defendants; and that
the defendants were entitled to specific performance of the
"'Sears

v. Braswell, 197 N. C. 515, 149 S. E. 846 (1929).
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written contract made in 1870. The plaintiffs replied,
pleading the statute of limitations against the equitable
counterclaim of the defendants.
In this case the essential allegations of the complaint
were not controverted, and the defendants relied entirely
upon their affirmative equitable defense. Therefore, no
issues were submitted on the allegations contained in the
complaint. Counsel had no difficulty in agreeing upon
issues directed solely at the affirmative defense. The following issues were submitted to the jury by agreement, the
first four being answered by the jury, the last two by the
court, as follows:
(1) Did Wells Draughn enter into a contract in
writing binding himself, his heirs and assigns to convey the land in question to said Richard H. Jones, as
alleged in the answer?
Answer: Yes.
(2) Did Richard H. Jones contemporaneously with
the execution of said contract execute and deliver
to Wells Draughn purchase money notes for the purchase price of said land, as alleged in answer?
Answer: Yes.
(3) Did Richard H. Jones subsequently pay said
purchase money notes to the legal holder thereof?
Answer: Yes.
(4) Have defendants and those under whom they
claim, been in quiet and undisturbed possession of
said land since 1872, under said contract?
Answer: Yes.
(5) Is defendants' counterclaim to remove plaintiffs' claim as a cloud upon their title, barred by the
Statute of Limitations?
Answer: No.

Answered by Court-Small, Judge.

(6) Are the plaintiffs the owners and entitled to
possession of lands described in the complaint?
Answer: No. Answered by Court-Small, Judge.
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Judgment was thereupon rendered which was affrmed
in the Supreme Court, that the defendants were the owners
of the land, and that the plaintiffs were required to execute
and deliver a conveyance to the defendants of all their
right, title and claim in and to said real estate; and the
judgment further provided that it should be recorded as
a deed, and upon such registration would take effect as
such conveyance."
If the verdict had been in favor of the plaintiffs on the
defendants' affirmative defense, the plaintiffs would have
been entitled to judgment on the pleadings and the verdict,
since the essential allegations of the complaint were not
controverted by the defendants. Thus the six questions
submitted to the jury, simple in form, requiring simple
answers, determined the entire controversy, under definite
instructions from the judge as to the circumstances which
would control the answers to such issues.
The essential issues in the case were the first three, as
to the making of the contract in writing back in 1870, and
the payment of the purchase price. The contract could
not be found, and the only evidence of it was the void deed
from Wells Draughn's executor, to Richard H. Jones, dated
in 1872, which recited the execution and delivery of such
a contract, and its substance. The defendants relied upon
this ancient deed upon the principle that recitals in an
ancient document are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. In his charge to the jury the judge instructed them that:
"The court charges you that before the defendants
can recover on this issue and on their counterclaim,
they must show that the alleged contract was entered
into by Wells Draughn; that the contract was in writing, and that it contained a sufficient memorandum
and agreement of the description of the land, and that
it was made for a valuable consideration. . . .The
defendants do not rely upon the deed, but rely upon
the recitals in the instrument that the executor signed,
purporting to be a deed, as evidence to prove clearly,
cogently and convincingly, that there was a contract
'ON. C. Con. Stat. (1919) Secs. 607 and 608.
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to convey the land in question, and that the contract
was executed and delivered, and that afterward, the
purchase price was paid by Jones in the form of notes,
and that afterward the notes were paid. Plaintiffs
contend that it not being lawful for an executor to
make a deed for lands of the testator, this executor
not being clothed with that authority, that the recitals
in the deed, it being a void deed, should not be accepted as evidence, etc."
The attention of the jury was called to all the arguments on both sides, with respect to the credibility of the
recitals in the deed, and their attention was clearly directed to the fact that the first three issues were the determinative issues in the case. This case should be reassuring to the Maryland lawyer who is apprehensive of difficulties in framing issues for a modified special verdict.
Frequently the Chancellor submits to the jury for its advisory opinion such questions in equity. The practice of
formulating issues which separately present all essential
matters of fact in dispute should, therefore, already be a
familiar one.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

One more illustration should suffice. In actions by a
number of material suppliers, against a building contractor
(R.L. Blalock) and the owner of the construction project
(A. C. L. R. R. Co.) and the surety on the contractor's compliance bond (American Surety Co.), consolidated for trial,
the plaintiffs alleged that they had furnished materials
which were used on the project, that the work had been
completed in substantial compliance with the contract, that
notice of claims had been given to the owner, that the chief
engineer of the owner had arbitrarily and in bad faith
refused his certificate of approval required by the contract,
that the owner had retained a large amount of money,
some $30,000.00, of the contract price; that the compliance
bond guaranteed the faithful performance of the contract,
one of the obligations secured being that all material men
must be paid; that the plaintiffs had not been paid, and
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had notified the owner and the surety company of the
amount of their respective claims. The owner answered,
denying the essential allegations of the complaint, and
alleging that the work had not been done in a workmanlike manner, or in substantial compliance with the specifications and drawings embraced in the contract; that its
chief engineer had so notified the contractor, and requested
compliance; that the chief engineer had withheld his certificate of approval, reasonably and in good faith; that it
was not liable either to the contractor or to the material
men until its chief engineer had certified his approval of
the work. The surety company answered in agreement
with the allegations of the complaint, except that it alleged
that its bond was only an indemnity bond, and that it was
not liable to the material men until after remedies against
the contractor and the owner had been exhausted. Issues
were agreed upon by counsel. The first issue involved
the amounts due the respective plaintiffs as material men,
and was answered in detail by stipulation. This issue
also, by consent, settled the question of liability of the
surety company to the plaintiffs. (There was a private
stipulation between the plaintiffs and the surety company,
which later gave rise to a dispute involving alleged conditions of liability, depending upon the outcome of the
case between the contractor and the owner.) The other
issues submitted were as follows:
2. Did the defendant Blalock construct the Kentucky Rock asphalt floors in the coach and paint shop
of the railroad company in the most substantial and
workmanlike manner, and -in strict accordance with
the specifications and drawings referred to in the contract?
Answer:

No.

3. Did the chief engineer of the Railroad Company on or about March 31st, 1925, condemn said floors
as not having been constructed in the most substantial
and workmanlike manner and in strict accordance
with the specifications and drawings referred to in the
contract, and so notify the contractor, Blalock, and
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request the said contractor to put said floors in a
satisfactory condition?
Answer:

Yes.

4. What would be the reasonable cost to the Railroad Company of reconstructing said floors in the most
substantial and workmanlike manner and in accordance with the terms of the contract?
A nsw er:

....................

5. Was the withholding or refusal to issue a
formal final certificate by the chief engineer of the
railroad company unreasonable, arbitrary, wrongful,
without just cause or excuse, and not in good faith as
alleged in the complaint?
Answer:

No.

6. Did each plaintiff give the defendant Railroad
Company notice of its claim within statutory time required by the lien laws of North Carolina?
Answer:

Yes.

7. In what amount, if any, is defendant Railroad
Company indebted to R. L. Blalock?
A nswer:

....................

The judge took the owner's view of its liability under
the contract, and instructed the jury that if they answered
the second issue, no, and the third issue, yes, and the fifth
issue, no, they need not answer the fourth and seventh
issues. He held that the finding on the third issue relieved the owner entirely, unless and until the contractor,
under whom the plaintiffs and the surety claimed, complied with the owner's demand. The surety company
settled with the plaintiffs and took subrogation receipts
and prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina,4 1 its principal ground of appeal being the instruction of the court above explained. It took the position
that upon the breach of the contract, as shown by the answers to the second and third issues, the owner was obliged
41 Southern Engineering Co., et al,, v. Blalock, et al., Fall Term, 1926,
not reported.
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to complete the work, and that it could not hold the entire
$30,000.00 withheld from the contractor, but only so much
thereof as was required to correct the deficiencies in the
work; it contended that the fourth and seventh issues
should have been answered by the jury. The case was
settled by compromise in the Supreme Court, before argument, between the surety company and the owner. This
verdict is a perfect illustration of the utility of the modified
special verdict in segregating and isolating the vital points
to be decided upon an appeal. The sole remaining question of law was clearly defined. If error had been found
in the instructions of the lower court, that the fourth and
seventh issues need not be answered, a new trial would
have been ordered only as to those two issues. The original trial consumed two weeks. The new trial could have
been completed in a day.
CONCLUSION

As said by Prof. Leon Green,42 "The jury is a means,-a
rough and ready means,-a crude piece of machinery at
best,-and if it is to be used rationally, these fine spun
hypotheses of the legal expert [the general charge] will
not have to be taken too seriously"; and again: "The
shorter the question the more likely will it be understood
and less likely will it be misleading. So long as it covers
a single issue, the more comprehensive the term, if understood by laymen, the better ....
Provision is made expressly for short and comprehensive questions by requiring
the trial judges to give explanation of such terms as are
thought to need it. There ought to be no more trouble
about this matter than any other matter where the use of
language is necessary." Any substantial change in procedure is likely to produce some confusion at first in giving
effect to it. Such was the history of the new code system
introduced in North Carolina in 1868.: 3 But a lawsuit is
merely for the purpose of doing justice, and lawyers
"See

supra, n. 16.
Crump v. Mimms, 64 N. C. 767 (1870) ; Parsley v. Nicholson, 65 N. C.
207 (1870) ; Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N. C. 510 (1873).
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trained under any system of pleading, having long been
used to analyzing cases and arguing them, with reference
to their vital points, should have little difficulty in transferring their analysis in any case from their briefs to the
jury issues.
The sole object of any attempt at improvement of court
procedure is to sharpen the tools with which judge, jury
and counsel have to work, to the end that a better job may
be done in less time and with less expense. Business men
have been short-circuiting the courts because of expense
and delay. One of the principal causes of excessive expense and delay is that more than one trial is required in
too many cases to achieve what should have been done the
first time. Each new trial takes more time and costs
more money. The use of the modified special verdict is
better adapted to achieve a correct result than the common
law general verdict, and its adoption has a tendency to
reduce the number of new trials and consequently the time
and expense required in any case.4 4
4 Hyde, Fact Finding by Special Verdict (1941) 24 Jour. Amer. Judicature Soc. 144. In North Carolina there are still too many new trials, but
they are not due to the use of the modified special verdict; most of them
could be avoided by improvements in the rules in other respects, two of
which, to conform with the new Maryland and Federal rules, are suggested in this paper, supra, circa notes 24 to 30. Four trials, instead of
one, were required in Batson v. City Laundry Co., 202 N. C. 560, 163 S. D'.
600 (1932); 205 N. C. 93, 170 S. E. 136 (1933); 206 N. C. 371, 174 S. E. 90
(1934) ; and 209 N. C. 223, 183 S. E. 413 (1936) because North Carolina
has not amended its rules to permit reservation of decision on motion to
nonsuit until after verdict, a procedure which has proved its efficacy elsewhere.

